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Cooperation and cooperatives in southern European wine production: the nature of successful 
institutional innovation 1880-1950.1 
Although informal cooperation amongst farmers is a feature of traditional societies, 
the development of cooperatives is relatively new, with few existing in European agriculture 
prior to the twentieth century. Furthermore, before the Second World War the relative 
importance of cooperatives varied greatly, both between countries and within the agricultural 
sector of individual countries. This paper looks first at the nature of traditional cooperation 
amongst wine producers in a rapidly changing economic environment, and then the 
establishment of formal wine making cooperatives in three producing countries - Italy, France 
and Spain. In the first section I examine a number of the major problems facing producers 
between 1880 and 1950, namely the appearance of new vine diseases, the persistence of weak 
wine prices for long periods, and rising wage costs. The second section shows how 
technological change gave producers opportunities to adapt to these problems. Some growers 
used the new biological technologies to produce significant increases in yields, whilst others 
tried to mechanize some of the tasks found in viticulture. The third section argues that 
cooperation amongst wine producers was very important in their attempts to remain 
competitive. Cooperation took place not just among small producers, but also between large 
and small growers. I suggest that this was because of two reasons. First, high monitoring 
costs associated with viticulture and rising wages provided incentives for larger fanners to 
establish formal and informal contracts with those growers who did not have enough land to 
employ fully their families. By contrast, the increasing economies of scale associated with 
wine making encouraged producers of small quantities of grapes to arrive at agreements with 
larger growers with surplus processing and storage capacity to make them into wine. The 
fourth section shows how the growing economies of scale in wine production and marketing, 
together with the possibilities of improving wine quality, encouraged small producers in the 
early twentieth century to establish wine making cooperatives. The fmal section considers 
why, despite the apparent economic advantages of membership for smaller producers, the 
diffusion of cooperatives varied significantly between, and within, these three countries. 
Access to long term cheap capital, the role of church and political parties in encouraging 
producer cooperatives, the availability or not of alternative wine making facilities, and the 
degree of mobility of small growers, are shown to be important. By the end of our period, 
I This research was made possible by a grant from the Spanish government (PB97-0085). I would like to thank 
the librarians at the FAO library for help in rmding materiel, and to Juan Carmona for allowing me to draw on 
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cooperatives were spreading rapidly into new areas, in part because some of these obstacles 
had been removed, but also because the state saw in cooperatives a useful instrument to 
intervene in the domestic wine market. 
1. Long run changes in prosperity. 
For a number of reasons, it is more difficult to compare the price of wine across 
geographic regions, and over time, than for most other agricultural products. First, consumers 
were willing to pay very different prices according to the nature of wine. For example, aliter 
of ordinary French table wine in London in 1873 cost just 4 per cent of that of a primiere cru, 
a very similar price difference to that found in Bordeaux itself.2 Major price differences 
encouraged producers and wine merchants to try and imitate expensive wines, leading to 
popular brands being widely copied.3 The problem of product differentiation was made worse 
by the fact that mixing wines was frequent. Many famous wines, such as Port, Sherry, 
Madeira, or Marsala, were strengthened by the addition of alcohol. But mixing ordinary table 
wines (coupage) was also widespread, both because stronger wines kept better, and for fiscal 
reasons (see below).4 Second, the quality of a particular wine changed over time. As wine 
makers frequently lacked a proper understanding of fermentation and maturing, and had 
under-equipped and poor wine making facilities, the vast majority of wines had to be 
consumed within the year of their production, if they were not to suffer serious changes in 
their composition. Third, especially prior to the railways, the bulky nature of wine limited its 
trade to those regions close to good water communications. As a result, most wines were 
traditionally drunk locally, leading to large price differences between regions. Fourth, even 
on the same farm there was often a large number of grape varieties, which might produce 
very different wines.s Finally, because wine was considered as a non-essential beverage for 
consumers by governments, it was usually subject to relative high local taxes - consumo in 
Spain, octroi in France, dazio consumo in Italy. 
Given these difficulties, wines were often priced according to their alcoholic strength. 
In Graph 1, the French and Italian figures are national prices, whereas those for Spain come 
our joint research, and for his comments on this text. 
2 The Wine Trade Review, cited in Pan-Montojo and Simpson, forthcoming, and Roudie, 1994, p.36, who notes 
that a leading Medoc sold for around 22 times that of a Saint-Macaire, Blaye or Bourg in 1840. 
3 For one example, that of sherry, see Simpson, 1985b, pp. 168-73. 
4 Mixing high strength Algerian wines with their own lower strength wines also allowed producers in the Midi 
to raise their yields. 
S All were normally rilixea together duritigTermentaiion,but it meant that neighbouring farms might produce 
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from a specialized wine producing area in Catalufia, and are less representative of the country 
as a whole. Cycles of high and low prices are easily visible for all three countries, although 
the depth and starting points often varied. Prices increased everywhere until the mid 1880s, 
when they began a long decline, bottoming out during the first decade of the twentieth 
century. The period of high prices witnessed a large growth in the production of artificial 
wines, often made from cheap "industrial" alcohol, especially from sugar beet. The low prices 
of the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed the first serious attempts to limit the 
production of these "fraudulent" wines. Between 1901 and 1907 wine producers in the 
Languedoc in southern France sold their wines at cost price or at a loss during five of the 
seven years, and the demonstration in Montpellier in June 1907 attracted over half a million 
protesters.6 During the First World War, prices recovered for a few years, although growers 
also faced increasing costs and smaller harvests, with output falling 18 per cent in 1915-9 
compared to 1910-14 in France, and 16 per cent in Italy.7 As output recovered in the early 
1920s, prices weakened once more. The situation worsened dramatically in the early 1930s, 
when France was forced to introduce legislation to restrict further planting, tax producers who 
had very high yields, and even try to ban the planting of a number of vine varieties which 
were responsible for excessively large yields of poor quality wine. During the Second World 
War the combined shortages of lab or and chemicals reappeared once more, and output fell 
which allowed prices to recover. However, because many of the 1930s restrictions had been 
relaxed during the war years, the early 1950s saw once more overproduction, and low wine 
prices. 
On the demand side, although most European wines in the mid nineteenth century 
were drunk locally, quality wines and spirits had accounted for a significant proportion of 
European trade in the Middle Ages and the Early Modem Period. This trade had been a major 
factor in stimulating changes in local production methods and improving product quality. By 
contrast, the period under discussion here had two very different features: first, the wine trade 
switched from being one of predominantly high quality wines to one of table wines, and 
second, from the late 1890s, the traditional major exporters, namely France, Italy and Spain, 
saw their markets declined in absolute terms. 
These changes in the international wine market can be explained by disease, 
very different wines. 
6 Warner, 1960, p.18. See especially Smith, 1978 and Frader, 1991, ch.7. 
7 In Spain, which was recovering from phylloxera, output increased by a third. The 1915 harvest everywhere 
was especially small on account of climatic conditions and the lack of chemicals for growers to protect their 
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especially phylloxera, and the growth in urban demand for cheap wines in France. Phylloxera 
was caused by an aphid which was transported to Europe from the New World, where many 
vines were immune to it. The speed of infection varied significantly within each country, but 
in time would destroy almost all of Europe's original vines. The remedy was to replant using 
American vines as rootstock, and then graft European varieties. As French domestic 
production slumped from its peak of 83.8 million hectoliters after the exceptional harvest of 
1875 (the equivalent of219liters per person net of foreign trade), to a low of23.2 million in 
1889, rising prices encouraged growers elsewhere to increase output. The result was that 
between 1880 and 1892 France imported the equivalent of a quarter of its own wine 
consumption, primarily from Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy.8 Even after the recovery of 
its domestic production, world trade remained dominated by French imports of cheap, strong 
wines used to blend with domestic ones.9 But the wine boom for Spain and Italy did not last, 
as France restricted imports from both countries, and turned instead to its colonies, especially 
Algeria. Algerian wine production increased from an annual average of 0.6 million hectoliters 
in 1880-4 to 7.9 million in 1909-13, reaching 15.6 millions by 1950-4. Most of this 
production was exported, and almost all to France. 10 As Table 1 below suggests, the 
combined exports from France, Italy and Spain declined, both in relative and absolute terms 
over the period 1880-1950. 
The decline in export opportunities implied that wine producers in southern Europe 
were increasingly dependent on their domestic markets for sales, where demand was 
primarily for table wines. Thus in Spain for example, ordinary table wine accounted for 94 
per cent of output, and "quality" and sparking wines made up less than 2 per cent.1I 
Unfortunately, income elasticity for wine was low, at least in the early twentieth century. 
Indeed, in terms of quantity, all time per capita consumption peaked in 1920-4 in France at 
168Iiters/person, in 1906-13 in Italy at 128Iiters/person, and 1920-4 in Spain at 96 
liters/person. 12 By the end of the period under discussion, demand was being driven primarily 
by population growth. 
The second major feature that influenced growers' profitability in this period was the 
vines against mildew. 
8 Production averaged 29.5 million hectoliters, exports 2.4 million, imports 9.7 million, and consumption 36.S 
million. Annuaire Statistigue 1933, pp.l79-S0. 
9 See Pan-Montojo and Simpson, forthcoming. 
10 For example, in 1925-9, average production was 11.1 miIlion hectoliters, of which S.1 million were exported, 
and 97.6 per cent of this figure wentto France. Ferrara, 1931, pp. 114-5. 
11 Liquors accounted fofriiost of the re'st: Miilisienode Agricultura, 1933, anuario 1932, pp.l2S-9. 
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rise in wages, especially from the turn ofthe twentieth century. Rising wages affected all 
aspects of agriculture, but viticulture was more labor intensive than most, and the possibilities 
of introducing labor saving technologies limited. However, once again, we can only show the 
general trends facing producers. In part this was because the use of wage labor was rare in 
many areas of viticulture, as we shall see. A second problem, and more serious, is that wages 
varied significantly during the year, both in response to the nature of the agricultural task, and 
to the opportunity cost of labor. Yet there is no doubting the long term trends in wages. 
Whereas in France, agricultural nominal wages increased by perhaps 20 per cent over the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, similar increases were much more localized in both Italy 
and Spain. More relevant perhaps is that for wine producers everywhere, any growth in wage 
costs was more than offset by the buoyant 'nature of wine prices. This situation changed 
significantly from the turn of the twentieth century, when producers were caught between 
rising wages, and falling wine prices (Table 2). Although in the short term, wine prices might 
rise more quickly than wages, such as during the First World War, in the long run labor costs 
increased faster. 13 By 1928 a day's wage in France could have bought 54 per cent more wine 
than it had done in 1873, 106 per cent in Italy, and 162 per cent more in Spain. This change 
clearly benefited consumers, but presented a sever challenge both to large producers using 
wage labor, and smaller ones working the vines with family labor. 
2. The response of producers to low prices and rising costs. 
Vines were cultivated under such a wide variety of conditions, that to attempt to 
describe a "typical" vineyard is impossible.14 However, the twin problems of low wine prices 
and rising wage costs affected directly, or indirectly, all producers. So too did vine diseases, 
. not just phylloxera, but also mildew and black rot, which were particularly virulent with the 
new American vines. Traditional pre-phylloxera viticulture had consisted essentially of two 
inputs: land, often marginal for other crops, and labor. Labor requirements involved a number 
of basic skills, especially pruning, but these could be learnt easily enough with informal 
education in the vineyard or village. New vines were planted either by layering (provignage), 
which involved the burying a cane from an established vine to the site where the new plant 
was required, or by planting directly a cutting. Entry costs of traditional viticulture were low. 
12 Annuaire statistigue 1933, p.463. Per capita consumption was lower after the Second World War. 
\3 Even those growers who paid no wages, but used family labor instead, would see their living standards 
seriously eroded unless they cut costs. 
14 Marescalchi (1924, pp.5-12), for example, found such significant differences in the average cost of producing 
5 
Phylloxera and other diseases raised these costs in a number of ways. First, chemicals 
accounted for around a fifth of annual cultivation costs by the 1920s.1 5 Second a more 
scientific approach was required to determine the best rootstock and scion to be grafted for 
each vineyard, and replanting saw an increase in the use of non-farm inputs. Finally, 
although the new vines might produce higher yields, they required a better preparation of the 
land before planting, and the greater use of fertilizers. 
How did producers of grapes, or manufactures of wine, react to these long run 
changes in wine prices, labor costs, and vine disease? We can divide their responses into four 
main areas. First, by switching out of vines into more profitable crops. Second, through unit 
cost reductions in grape production in the form of labor saving technologies. Third, by 
increasing yields through recourse to new biological technologies. Finally, by exploiting the 
growing economies of scale in wine making and its marketing. Two other important areas, 
namely attempts to improve product quality and government intervention in wine markets to 
support prices are also considered briefly. We leave to the following section a more detailed 
discussion of growers' decision making. 
Lower wine prices and rising costs, especially after phylloxera, encouraged some 
farmers to look for alternative crops. Yet in general, winegrowers were loath to uproot vines 
before their productive life had ended, for a number of reasons. First, the high costs of 
planting had already been paid for; second, the land was usually not very productive for other 
crops; and finally, because viticulture provided significantly more employment on a small 
plot of unirrigated land than most other crops. Although the area of vines in France peaked in 
the pre-phylloxera period at about 204 million hectares in the mid 1870s, the area then fell 
only slowly from 1.7 million hectares in 1900 to lA million by the early 1950s. However, as 
Table 3 suggests, if Algeria is taken as an economic extension of France, then the joint area 
remains very stable over the first half of the twentieth century. Elsewhere, the total area of 
vines in Italy remained at around 4.0 million hectares, the equivalent of very roughly 1.8 
million hectares when the area of vines in mixed cultivation is converted into specialized 
viticulture, and in Spain, the area fluctuated around lA million hectares between 1900 and 
1950.16 This stability in the area of vines, together with the decline in wine prices, attests to 
the capacity of producers to adapt, although increasingly in the 1930s and 1950s, with the 
grapes in Italy in the early twentieth century. 
IS The exact amount naturally varies significantly between vineyards. A figure of 18 per cent was given for 
Tarragona (Spain) in 1921. Instituto de Reformas Sociales; 1923, pp.16l-74. 
16 The area of mixed cultivation is converted to specialised crops by dividing it by 3.6, a coefficient given in 
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need of the state to help distill surplus production. 
Attempts at labor saving can be divided into three main areas: the introduction of new 
energy forms in the vineyards, the use of mechanical sprays, and the introduction of new 
hand instruments which simplified both harvesting and pruning operations. Although 
important advances were to be found in a few areas prior to the 1880s, the combination of 
phylloxera, low wine prices and rising real wages saw an important diffusion in their use with 
the replanting of vineyards. We shall consider each briefly in turn. 
The ease by which vines can be damaged implies that considerable care is needed in 
their cultivation. Until very recently, there was no mechanical alternative to the labor 
intensive tasks of harvesting or pruning. By contrast, growers in our period faced a choice of 
techniques in the cultivation of vines. The use of animal drawn ploughs was certainly not 
new, but the high density of vines in some regions, the unorganized nature by which they had 
been planted, and the unscientific nature of pruning implied that a considerable amount of 
work had to be done by hand. The need to replant after phylloxera allowed growers to 
reorganize planting with a view to cutting annuallabor inputs. The planting of vines in 
straight lines, a decline in the number of plants per hectare, and the use of wire trellises, all 
facilitated the greater use of ploughs in the cultivation between the rows. The potentiallabor 
saved was considerable, and in those areas which could not cut costs in this way because of 
the steep gradient of the land, such as Priorato in Spain, were not replanted. 
The post-phylloxera vines were more susceptible to disease, especially mildew and 
black rot, requiring the use of chemicals. The development of sprays helped keep the rise in 
costs in check, but so too did row planting, which allowed workers to move more easily 
amongst the vines and control better the quantity of chemicals used. 
Another possibility was for growers to increase output rather than cut costs, and here 
two alternatives presented themselves: to improve quality, and hopefully the price the grower 
received for the wine, or take advantage of rapid advances in biological and chemical 
technologies, and select the most productive vines for a particular vineyard. One major 
obstacle for producers of fine wines was the lack of control they had over the wine after it left 
their farms. Fine wines might well bring high prices, but these in turn encouraged imitators, 
and consumers found it difficult to distinguish between different products. One solution to 
this problem was the appellation controlee (AOC), which in France in the 1930s tried to 
define wines by geographic area, type of grapes used, alcoholic strength, and restricted 
B'OIV, 195 .... , and used throughout this paper. 
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production practices some considered undesirable. By the early 1950s, about 10 per cent of 
all French wines were AOe, with smaller percentages in Italy and Spain. 17 For the majority 
of producers however, higher prices were not in general sufficient to offset the lower yields 
associated with quality wines, or the significantly higher costs found in both the vineyards 
and the maturing of wine. Instead, grape production was one of the first crops where growers 
successfully turned to science to increase output significantly, and also one of the first in 
suffering persistent problems of overproduction as a consequence. 
Wine yields are a poor indicator of technical progress, because in areas of quality 
production they tend to be low, and because they vary significantly over the life of the vine. 
Furthermore, in those areas such as Italy where intercropping was important, they might not 
even be the principal crop. A final problem is that the planting of vine varieties which 
produced very high yields of poor quality wine were banned in France and Italy, briefly in the 
1930s, and again in the 1950s. However, Table 3 sheds important light on the experience of 
four countries. In the first instance, we see that yields in France and Algeria were higher than 
the other two countries and, in the case of the metropolis, had a tendency to grow over the 
period. Even before phylloxera, there had been a move in the Languedoc to expand wine 
production on the fertile plains which increased yields, but at the cost of a decline in quality. 
The appearance ofphylloxera encouraged further this process, but it also stimulated a great 
deal of scientific research into vines and wine production. In particular, the scientific 
community became split between those that believed growers should use European vines 
grafted onto American rootstock, and those who preferred using "hybrids" or "direct 
producers".18 For quality wine producers, there was no debate, as quality was only achieved 
by grafting. However, most growers in France did not produce quality wines, and the 
attraction of hybrids was that they produced large quantities of wine, even though it was often 
only fit for blending. By 1929 one seventh of vines were hybrids, a figure which had grown 
to almost a fifth and about 300,000 hectares by the early 1940s. Despite new planting 
restrictions, the figure had reached 31 per cent of the total area of 1.3 million hectares in 
1958, and 42 per cent of wine production.19 Almost as important as higher yields, hybrids 
required far less care and chemicals than the grafted vinifera vines.20 Therefore, as Table 3 
17 Lachiver, 1988, p.584. Not too much should be read into these figures however. Quality wines were, by their 
very nature, exclusive products. A number of AOCs were made far too large, such as Bordeaux or Chianti, and 
it was necessary for small groups of producers within these regions to establish other, more limited appellations. 
18 "Hybrids" were vines planted directly, which needed no grafting. 
19 Paul,1996, pp. 102 and 105, 'wlierethe'debate over the introduction of hybrids is fully covered. 
20 Ibid.,p.lOO. 
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suggests, many French and Algerian producers sought to overcome low wine prices and 
increasing unit costs by maximizing output per hectare. 
In Italy, hybrids were introduced early in the north and center of the country, but 
legislation in the 1930s halted their progress, and one report in the late 1940s, whilst unable 
to suggest an area of cultivation, claimed that they did not "present a serious threat to our 
oenology" .21 Instead, growers in Italy intercropped on a large scale. In 1913, for example, 76 
per cent of the North's vines were intercropped, 85 per cent of vines in the Center, but only in 
the drier South and Islands did it fall to 12 per cent. 22 
Finally in Spain, the dry climate made the use of hybrids rare/3 yields were 
significantly lower that in the other countries, and growers in general were unable to 
intercrop. Instead, whereas in La Mancha growers competed successfully by taking low 
density: low cost viticulture to an extreme, those in more traditional areas of production, 
such as Catalufia, were less successful either at reducing production costs (as in La Mancha) 
or increasing yields significantly (as in the Midi).24 
To complement these change in the vineyards, there were changes in wine making 
facilities. Traditional wine making was simple, but labor intensive. In Italy and Spain, for 
example, grapes were still crushed by treading in many wine districts at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.25 A worker, during a hard day trod between 4 and 6 tons of grapes, 
producing roughly 25-40 hectoliters ofwine.26 Not only was productivity low, but this labor 
intensive task coincided with the peak time of employment in the vineyard when labor was 
scarce. This fact facilitated the spread of cylindrical crushers in the larger vineyards from the 
late nineteenth century. Productivity improved with Marcilla Arrazola citing a small model, 
worked by two men, processing 2.2 tons of grapes an hour, or larger, engine powered models, 
between 5 and 10 tons.27 A characteristic feature of the period was that it was in areas of 
cheaper wines which were at the forefront of technological change. Producers of quality 
wines were slow to change, in this case because they feared that mechanical crushers would 
ruin quality.28 
21 B'OIV, 1947, no.195, p.291. 
22 MAIC, 1914. 
23 B'OIV, 1950, no.238, p.40. 
24 Carmona and Simpson, 1998, and Simpson, 1995, pp.208-14. 
2S For Spain, see Elias de Molins, 1904. 
26 Marcilla Arrazola, 1954, 2, pp.69-70. This is equivalent to the output of about one hectare. 
27 Ibid. p.70. 
28 For example, in Spain by the early 1950s, crushing by treading had disappeared in "almost" all wineries, with 
the notable exception of sherry making in Jerez de la Frontera. Ibid., p.70. 
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A second advantage was speed. To make good wine it was necessary to fill vats as 
quickly as possible, because the entry of newly crushed grapes would set off a secondary 
fermentation with the must already present. Many small producers, however, owned only one, 
or at best two, vats, which had to serve for their whole harvest, and so new must was 
constantly being added during the harvest. In addition, small producers often had to sell the 
must immediately after its fermentation, as they lacked storage space to mature it.29 This 
encouraged producers to carry out a long fermentation, in open vats. A major restriction to 
improving wine quality was therefore the need for both sufficient and adequate space for 
-
fermentation and maturing, and the relatively high investment that adequate storage implied. 
Although in the interwar period some growers in France began to experiment with a shorter 
fermentation of five or six days, and to produce a lighter wine which was quick to mature,30 
this was not an option for many small producer. Indeed, many medium and small producers 
were unable to produce wine which would last longer than the spring.31 
For large scale producers, as we shall see when we consider cooperatives, the 
direction of technological change offered important economies of scale, which allowed wines 
to be produced more cheaply, of a better quality (scale allowed the employment of trained 
chemists and the provision of a laboratory), and gave the owner greater bargaining power for 
the sale of wine. 
3. Formal and informal cooperation in the vineyards. 
Prior to the late nineteenth century, most grape production was small scale, with 
vineyards being worked by either the landowner using family labor, or some form of 
sharecropping contract. This was because in traditional viticulture the low price of most 
wines did not compensate the high monitoring costs of wage labor. Monitoring labor was 
costly because ploughing and hoeing too close to the vines would damaged the roots, and 
poor pruning not only affected yields, but might also damage permanently the plant.32 
Obviously, where wines fetched high prices, such as in the better vineyards of Bordeaux or 
Jerez (sherry) for example, then estate owners were compensated sufficiently to make the use 
of wage labor attractive. In most places, however, they were not. Vines were also rarely 
rented, as tenants would have been tempted to maximize output before the end of their lease, 
29 This was true of much of Barcelona in the 1880s, for example. Archivo del Ministerio de Agricultura, 81-3. 
30 Loubere, 1990, p.89. 
31 Galtier, 1958, l,pp.338-9:" .... ,. . c ., 
32 Galassi, 1992, pp.81-2, Hoffinan, 1984, pp.315-7, and Carmona and Simpson, 1999. 
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leaving the landowner with a vineyard whose productive life had been significantly 
shortened. 
However, the movement of wine prices and wage costs, and the changing nature of 
the post-phylloxera production which we have seen, encouraged cooperation. We shall look 
at three such areas where this occurred. First, the joint purchase of inputs and exchange of 
technical information, especially amongst smaller growers. Second, for large landowners, the 
heavy labor costs associated with replanting vines encouraged the use of a wide variety of 
sharecropping contracts. Finally, cooperation was encouraged between large landowners-
who looked for ways of reducing monitoring costs, and thereby to increase the scale of 
production, and smaller family growers - who wanted to benefit from the scientific and 
technical advances taking place. 
Although passed essentially to help trade union activities for industrial workers, the 
1884 law on association in France had its biggest impact in the countryside. Between 1884 
and 1910, the number of agrarian syndicates increased at the rate of about 210 societies a 
year, to reach 5,146 syndicates with 777,066 members.33 Wine producers were quick to take 
advantage of the new legislation. In the first instance disease, especially phylloxera, created 
major problems which growers individually could not solve. Syndicates collected and 
circulated information amongst members on the best way to deal with phylloxera, and 
provided information and instructions on the use of new root stock and grafting. A second 
area was the provision of the vines themselves, chemicals and fertilizers. This benefited 
growers not just because bulk purchases were cheaper, but because the syndicate was able to 
check quality, especially important as fraud in all countries was a major problem, for at least 
the first half of our period. Finally, in France, syndicates helped to check another form of 
fraud, namely that of the production and sale of "artificial wines", which many growers 
believed was the prime reason for the weak prices. In time, the syndicates would have an 
important role in the running of appellation controlee. Elsewhere, syndicates were less 
important than in France, but the same problems encouraged a group response, rather than an 
individual one. 
By contrast, at the farm level, there were a number of areas where the landowner, and 
those who worked the vines, could cooperate for mutual advantage. In some areas, 
sharecropping was a convenient way for landlords to work the land, as the sharecropper 
participated in any increase in harvest, and therefore had an incentive to work the vines 
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carefully, thereby reducing monitoring costs for the landowner. Yet problems of moral 
hazard remained. A sharecropper might attempt to increase the short term output of the vine 
at the expense of reducing its commercial life, if he had previously decided to leave the farm 
in the near future. This problem was overcome in two very different ways. First, in the case 
of the rabassa morta in Catalufia, the vines were the actual property of the sharecropper.34 
Because sharecroppers would replant the dead or dying vines, the contracts were essentially 
indefinite until phylloxera struck in the late nineteenth century. The advantage for the 
landlord of the rabassa morta was that monitoring costs were non-existent, and management 
-
requirements were reduced to collecting the agreed share of the harvest, usually a third. Even 
after phylloxera, many contracts remained longer than the expected life of the vineyard.35 
A second very different sharecropping model was found in Tuscany and elsewhere in 
central Italy, the mezzadria.36 Here vines were only a part, and at times a small part, of the 
sharecroppers output. Cropping decisions were taken from the central farm (fattoria), and 
management input was significantly higher than found in Catalufia. Contracts were annual, 
and the sharecropper was required to use all the family labor on his farm (podere). Problems 
of moral hazard and incentives were overcome by the tradition of renewing contracts 
annually, although with the landlord retaining the right to evict sharecroppers if they wished. 
Both of these sharecropping contracts had a long history, with the mezzadria being 
widespread by the thirteenth century, and the rabassa morta from the seventeenth century. 
Both were also essentially long term contracts, and appear to have functioned well prior to the 
late nineteenth century. Then, as has been argued for Catalufia, the impact of rising wages, 
weak wine prices, and increased costs because of phylloxera all weakened the incentives for 
both landowners (who saw management involvement increase sharply), and sharecroppers 
(who saw the opportunity cost of their labor rise as industrialization increased rapidly in 
neighboring Barcelona).37 In Tuscany there was also unrest, with strikes for example over 
who should pay for the new chemicals that vines required. 38 Yet the ability of landowners 
here to either direct resources to other more profitable crops in areas where the vine was of 
less importance, or attempt to raise product quality, and promote the chianti brand name, 
33 HA, 1911, 1, pp.256-7. 
34 For a full description of the working of this contract, and its change over time, see Carmona and Simpson, 
1999. 
3S For a general survey of sharecropping in French viticulture, see Loubere, 1978, pp. 
36 The literature on the workings ofmezzadria is considerable. See for example, Biagioli, Galassi, Pazzagli .... 
37 Carmona and Simpson; 1999. "--
38 De Simone, 1979; Radi, 1962 
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allowed greater flexibility than in Catalufia (the Chianti Classico area was redefined in 1932). 
In Catalufia the most successful diversification away from table wines was the production of 
cava, a sparkling champagne type of wine, which accounted for less than one per cent of 
output in the early 1930s. Nevertheless, the diverse movement of labor costs and farm prices, 
combined with the growing capital requirements of agricultural produced the same tensions in 
Tuscan society as in Catalufia, and the mezzadria was abolished shortly after our period ends. 
However, ifphylloxera coincided with an upward movement in wage costs and weak 
wine prices, which increased tensions between landowners and sharecroppers in areas were 
contracts were considered long-term, elsewhere they provided an incentive for large 
landowners to attract landless labor and establish sharecropping contracts for the first time. 
Replanting after phylloxera required large quantities oflabor to clear the old vines and 
prepare the land for the new ones and, despite the greater capital needs for purchasing 
American vines and chemicals, many areas of the Mediterranean's viticulture remained labor 
intensive. In both Campo de Carifiena and Navarra in Spain, for example, landowners used 
sharecropping contracts for apparently the first time after phylloxera, to replant and work the 
vines.39 
The conditions of the late nineteenth century were also ideal for the rapid growth of 
extensive viticulture in two relatively new regions, namely La Mancha in central Spain and 
Pug lie in southern Italy. Both areas benefited from low cost land and labor, and their distance 
from major urban markets was significantly reduced with the railways. In La Mancha, the 
very dry climatic conditions reduced the risks of vine diseases, and therefore made the use of 
chemicals unnecessary in most years. Yields were smaller, but so were production costs. 
Under these conditions the area under vines in La Mancha increased from around 170 
thousand hectares in the late 1880s, to 375 hectares by the early 1930s. Much of this increase 
took place on large farms, and land which had previously been used for extensive cereals or 
poor grazing. To attract labor, and reduce monitoring costs, landowners used a wide variety 
of sharecropping contracts to plant and cultivate the vines.40 
In Puglie, the area of vines increased from 134 thousand hectares in 1879/83 to 282 
thousand in 1913, a figure which was maintained in the early 1950s.41 Like La Mancha, 
much of this increase took place on land where population density was low, and cultivation 
extensive. Land ownership was also large, and contractual conditions for sharecroppers varied 
39 Jaen, 1904, p.l 04, and Sabio, 1995, pp. 174-80 and 219-20. 
40 Cannona, forthcoming. 
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depending on the relative scarcity oflabor, and the price ofwine.42 Phylloxera, and the 
collapse of wine prices in the late l880s saw many of the old contracts come to an end but 
new ones, often more attractive to the sharecropper, appeared in their place.43 However, 
sharecroppers in Puglie were usually only part time, and their main income came from 
working as wage earners on the large estates.44 Although it is not clear what percentage of 
vines were worked using sharecroppers, the system helped keep a skilled, local wage labor 
force available for larger farmers, a role played by small property owners in the Languedoc. 
In the Languedoc, large landowners preferred capital intensive, high yield viticulture, 
using wage labor, rather than sharecropping. Even prior to phylloxera, some growers had 
moved production from the hills - where quality wines, but in relatively small quantities were 
produced, to the fertile plains. After phylloxera, the planting of grape varieties such as 
Aramon, or direct producers, brought significantly greater yields - often a 100 hectoliters or 
more a hectare, but of very poor quality. High yields required heavy inputs of lab or, which 
was made easier by the fact that the traditional high monitoring costs found in viticulture 
were slowly being reduced. First, and following the work of Guyot, the new vines of the 
plains were planted in straight lines and trained to grow up wire trellises. As Guyot wrote, not 
only did this make it considerably easier to cultivate the vines, but: 
"Par un simple coup d'oeille long de sa vigne alignee, le proprietaire constate 
l'exactitude ou l'incurie de son vigneron: le maltre vigneron, de son cote, 
controle avec la meme facilite la quantite et la bonne fa90n du travail de 
chacun de ses ouvriers. ,,45 
Second, pruning knives which, unless kept very sharp, often tore the vines, were 
replaced by the secateur from the late nineteenth century.46 Finally, and as Pech has shown, 
landownership over the period became increasing concentrated in two different sizes: estates 
of 40 hectares or more, and those of less than 10 hectares. Large estate owners reduced 
monitoring costs of wage labor, not just by following Guyot and redesigning their vineyards, 
but also by increasing incentives for good work. In the first instance, growers with not 
41 MAIC, 1892, xxxiv; MAIC, 1914, p.16, which notes that there was no intercropping; ISTAT, 1954, p .... 
42 Inchiesta Par1amentare, 1909, Puglie, pp.442-5. An excellent brief survey of this source, and the use of 
multiple contracts in southern Italy is to be found in Galassi and Cohen, 1994. 
43 Inchiesta Parlamentare, 1909, Puglie, p.445. 
44 Ibid. p.436. 
45 Guyot; 1861, p.19: ... 
46 Loubere, 1978, p.83 and Frader, 1991, p.31. 
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enough land to employ their whole family fully, found skilled employment on the estates 
which might be repeated indefinitely on an annual basis if done well. In addition, landowners 
were sometimes willing to let skilled vinedressers work a six hour day, finishing at two or 
three o'clock each afternoon so that they might then return to work their own vine. 47 A 
second area of incentives for good work was the sharing by large producers of technical 
knowledge by, for example, allowing workers to remove suitable rootstock for their own 
vineyards. Third, large producers could provide access to their wine making facilities for the 
small growers in exchange for labor in the vineyard.48 Therefore the rapidly changing nature 
and growing capital requirements of viticulture helped large owners to bargain more 
effectively for labor, thereby offsetting, at least in part, the rising costs of wage labor. Finally, 
economies of scale were becoming greater in vineyards. In the Languedoc in the early 1950s 
it was estimated that one man and an animal could be employed with seven hectares of vines. 
Yet at this time over half of all vines were found on vineyards smaller than this size. Some 
growers obviously had other land, and were thus able to find sufficient work to keep an 
animal. However, many did not, and instead entered into formal and informal contracts with 
other larger farmers.49 
4. The growth of cooperatives. 
In France, societies for the collective manufacture of cheese - the "fruitieres", date 
back from the twelve century. 50 The law of 31 st March 1884, which removed the need for 
government consent for any association of more than twenty people, is generally considered 
as providing a major incentive to the development of modern cooperatives. Some of these 
were producer cooperatives although, as Table 4 shows, cheesemaking remained by far the 
most common on the eve of the First World War. This was hardly surprising, as they were 
relatively small and required limited quantities of capital. The first French wine cooperative 
appeared in 1901 at Mudaisan, quickly followed by another at Maraussan, both in Herault 
(Languedoc).5\ The law of the 29th December 1901 (together with the decrees of 30th May 
and 26th August, 1907) allowed agrarian cooperatives of production and sale access to long 
term credit at the almost uniform rate of 2 per cent for 25 years. Capital was provided by the 
state, but lent through regional credit banks, who were responsible for the loans. Monitoring 
47 Smith, 1975, p.365. 
48 Frader, 1991, p.36. 
49 Etudes et Conjoncture, 1956, 6, pp.530-1. 
50 HA, 1911, 1, p.280. In northern Italy a similar institution, the turnario sociale dates from slightly later. 
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therefore was done by local banks, but transaction costs were greatly reduced because 
cooperatives were required to establish a specific legal structure if they wished to receive 
loans. 
Access to long term credit was certainly not the only, or even the principle reason, for 
the founding of these early cooperatives. Many were strongly influenced by socialist 
ideology, and were seen as a solution to the extremely low wine prices between 1900 and 
1907. It was under these conditions that fIles vignerons libres de Maraussan" established a 
producer's cooperative to sell wine to consumer cooperatives in Paris. But as early as 1906 
the members had constructed and equipped a modem cooperative winery, which had an initial 
capacity of 15,000 hectoliters, at a cost of 175 thousand francs. The Ministry of Agriculture 
contributed 30 thousand francs, the local regional bank (under the 1906 Law) provided a long 
term loan of 109 thousand francs, and a further 30 thousand francs was raised from consumer 
cooperatives in Paris. The subscription of the 120 members was just 25 francs each.52 The 
example of Maraussan provides two important insights, namely the contribution that 
ideology, in this case socialism, can play in setting up a simple wine cooperative, but the very 
high capital costs involved in constructing a large, modem winery. 
Although the low wine prices between 1900 and 1907 encouraged the formation of 
cooperatives - the "filles de la misere", Table 5 shows that numbers continued to grow 
steadily throughout the first half of the twentieth century, with only a temporary halt during 
the two world wars. By the time of the economic crisis of the early 1930s, cooperatives 
numbered 630, significantly more than in either Italy or Spain. The severe difficulties of the 
early 1930s saw a number of attempts at state intervention in the wine market,53 and 
cooperatives were seen as a useful instrument for policy implementation. By the early 1950s, 
cooperatives produced about a quarter of all French wines, a figure which reached over half in 
the Rhone Valley. 54 
The French experience was not matched by either Italy or Spain. In both countries, 
the first wine cooperatives predated those of France. In Italy, a cantine sociale was 
established at 8agno di Ripoli, near Florence in 1888, and around 1910 there were reported to 
have been "slightly in excess of 150".55 But most cooperatives were short lived, and in 1924 
51 Lachiver, 1988, pp.482-3. 
52 Gide, 1926, pp.l29-31. 
53 Warner, 1960, chaps. 6, 7 and 8. 
54 In Algeria it was 17 per cent. 
ss HA, 1915, voL2,p.152: A further40 cooperative" distilleries were also active. The cooperative at Bagno di 
Ripoli was not active long. 
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numbers were down to 80, before recovering to 128 in 1933, and accounting for 1.3 per cent 
of the nation's wine production.56 We shall leave to section 5 comments on why this initial 
growth of Italian cooperatives faded so quickly. In Spain it was claimed that there were 215 
wine cooperatives and 19 distilleries in 1952, with a total membership of 60 thousand 
growers, and producing about 1.5 million hectoliters, or ten per cent of national outpUt.57 In 
Spain, as in France and Italy, the number of wine cooperatives was increasing fast in this 
period, but these figures are likely to include a number whose wine making facilities were 
still under construction. Furthermore, even if the output figures are correct, the harvests of the 
early 1950s were exceptionally low. Prior to the 1936-9 Civil War, wine cooperatives in 
Spain were probably well below a hundred. 
Wine cooperatives, were established for three distinct activities: the crushing, 
fermenting and pressing of grapes; the maturing and selling of wines; and the processing of 
the wine lees - the remains of the grapes after they had been crushed, to make both spirits and 
tartic acid. These activities suggest five economic reasons why small growers were attracted 
to setting up a cooperative. 
In the first instance, there were economies of scale in wine making, as we have 
already noted in section 2. These economies became increasingly apparent as the period 
progressed. By the early 1950s, the average size ofa wine cooperative was 15,000 
hectoliters, costing 60 million francs, which was beyond the means of even medium sized 
wine producers. 58 The greatest economies were achieved not in the production of quality 
wines, but with table wines, where large quantities could be pressed and matured together. 
There were, however, limits to the economies of scale, even with table wines. For example, 
one of the major problems during fermentation was the need to control temperature. Ifvats 
were too large, then the wine became too warm and the fermentation process stops. In 
general, vats of 300 hectoliters were considered about the maximum, although if they were 
made of concrete, which absorbed more heat than wood, they might be slightly larger. In one 
very large private winery in Aude (Languedoc), which had 215 hectares of vines producing 
30,000 hectoliters of wine, at the rate of 1,400 hectoliters a day, there were 20 fermenting 
vats, each with a capacity of around 350 hectoliters.59 In fact, the first half of the twentieth 
century probably saw a reduction in the size of vats, as the fermentation process became 
56 Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1933, pp.145 and 147. 
57 B'OIV, 1952, no. 253, p.63. 
58 B'OIV, 1954, no. 283, p.49, and Galtier, 1958, I, pp.338-9. 
59 The producer was Jouarres, at Minervois. Barbut, cited in Loubere, 1978, p.199. 
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better understood.60 Likewise, there were limits to the size of the maturing vats. Therefore 
according to one report, the capital cost per unit of capacity of "une simple curve" of 15 
thousand hectoliters was given exactly the same as that of one of 175 thousand. 61 By contrast, 
unit operating costs of larger wineries were often lower. Thus one cooperative in 1950 
processing 152 thousand hectoliters required only 40 per cent labor per hectoliter than was 
used in another, processing 11 thousand; in another study, this time of 12 cooperatives in 
1949, the cost of wine making varied between 78 and 169 francs per hectoliter.62 In part, cost 
comparison are made difficult because of the treatment by cooperatives of interest and 
depreciation in their accounting. However, and in conclusion, although economies of scale no 
doubt were a factor in the decision in setting up a cooperative, the fact that wine making 
represented only between 3 and 8 per cent of the final price suggests it was probably not 
crucia1.63 
Probably more important than cost savings was the improved quality and consistency 
of wines produced by better management and technical skills. The scientific knowledge 
concerning the nature of wine and the problems associated with its making and storing 
increased significantly after the publication of Pasteur's major work in 1864. Although 
technical debates on such issues as the ideal length of time for the fermentation, or the best 
way to treat wine which was becoming unstable would continue, the technical equipment and 
skills required in viniculture if drinkable wine was to be consistently produced had by the 
early twentieth century, if not before, moved well beyond what the majority of grape 
producers could either understand, or carry out. As Galtier notes, cooperatives created a new 
type of professional - a manager who was both an oenologist and who at the same time could 
attend to the legal and commercial sides of the business. At first, the technical processes were 
often directed by a respected member of the community, but increasingly the larger 
cooperatives looked for trained agronomists, and especially oenologists. In France, from 
1939, the Ecole Nationale d'Agriculture in Montepellier started annual courses specifically 
for cooperative technicians.64 
A third potential advantage were economies of scale in marketing. Cooperative 
60 B'OIV 1952, no. 254, p.43. 
61 B'OIV, 1952, no.254, p.41. In Spain, by contrast, a winery with a 20,000 hectoliter capacity was estimates to 
cost two million pesetas, with smaller ones increasing by 15 per cent, and larger ones failing by the same 
amount. B'OIV, 1952, no.254, pp.3I-2. 
62 Both cited in GaItier, 1958, I, p.377. 
63 Figures from Galtier, 1958, I, p.377: .. 
64 Galtier, 1958, I, p.376. 
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members had better access to urban markets by producing large quantities of a standardized 
wine under scientific conditions, than by trying to sell individually their own production. 
Pech notes how one giant private producer with facilities to produce 100 thousand hectoliters, 
the Compagnie des Salins du Midi (C.S.M.) received on average 19.25 francs per hectoliter in 
the period 1893-1913, against a regional average of 16.00 francs. By contrast Gelly, a small 
producer in the same region who produced little more than 400 hectoliters, received 27 per 
cent less than the C.S.M. during the period 1893-1906. Of greater importance, in poor years 
the difference was even greater, Gelly being paid only 4.8 francs in 1904 against 11.5 francs, 
received by the C.S.M.65 As noted above, the Maraussan cooperative was initially established 
for the sale of wines, rather than their production. However, plenty of growers, especially in 
areas of better quality wines, took their grapes to the cooperative for crushing and fermenting, 
but sold the wine themselves. We shall return to this point in section 5. 
A fourth advantage was that cooperatives reduced a farmer's labor requirements by 
increasing capital, a feature not usually considered necessarily beneficial on small, family 
farms. However, because labor was saved at the harvest time when family resources were 
fully stretched, it often reduced the growers' need for wage labor, rather than making family 
labor idle. Furthermore, the fact that growers no longer fermented all their grapes in a single 
vat, which required the harvest to be collected as rapidly as possible, reduced further the need 
to employ wage labor.66 
Finally cooperatives were established for processing the remains of grapes after wine 
making. Small producers had often traditionally produced spirits themselves, but new 
technology allowed entirely new products to be produced.67 
5. What explains the success or failure of wine cooperatives? 
In the previous section we have seen that the growth of cooperatives varied 
significantly between countries, and that although they appeared later in France than in the 
other two countries, by the interwar period they had become more widespread. Of particular 
interest is the Italian case because, after an early rapid growth, numbers then declined. For the 
historian, even more difficult than establishing with any certainty the total number of 
cooperatives and their membership in any single year, is the difficulty in showing to what 
extent changes in total numbers occurred because new cooperatives came into operation, or 
6S Pech, 1975, p.l58. 
66 Galtier, 1958, I, p.340. 
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because old ones disappeared. For Italy it is possible to show the low level of long term 
success of the early cooperatives in a little more detail. In 1904 the Italian state established a 
fund of 700,000 lire to encourage the modernization of wine making facilities. The 1908 
report gives details of 33 cooperatives which took part successfully in obtaining a share of 
these funds. Of these 33 cooperatives, only twelve were still active twenty five years later, in 
1929.68 By 1958, of these surviving twelve, three were still definitely operational (Oleggio 
and Mombaruzzo in Piemonte, and the Cantina Sociale della Pioppa at Carpi in Emilia), and 
another five perhaps working.69 Of the remaining four, three were not mentioned in the 1958 
survey and the fourth, Soave (in Verona) is given as having started in 1930, with the original 
one presumably having to ceased to operate. Therefore our sample of 33 in 1908 was severely 
depleted by the late 1920s which supports contemporary opinion that Italian cooperatives 
found it difficult to remain active for very 10ng.?O 
What explains the differences in the success of cooperatives, both between different 
countries, and within them? In the first instance access to capital was critical. Most writers 
argue that the long term, low interest loans provided by the French government were a 
positive incentive for growers to set up their cooperative. As we have noted, the state 
provided either directly or indirectly four fifths of the capital requirements for the Maraussan 
cooperative in 1906, a figure which remained similar at the end of our period.?l In addition, 
the state provided free technical information on the construction and equipping of the 
cooperative, and favorable tax conditions. These advantages which French wine producers 
enjoyed can best be appreciated by looking at the situation in Italy and Spain. In Italy, the 
lack of government backed loans implied that capital was difficult for cooperatives to obtain 
and expensive, and was a frequently cited for their slow growth in the 1920s.72 In Valencia in 
Spain, the small growers in Utiel had to wait 22 years before they were able to construct their 
own winery, whilst in neighboring Requena, cooperative members themselves constructed the 
67 These will be inclued in the final version of this paper. 
68 Among these twelve I include Mombaruzzo in Piemonte, even though it is not given in 1929 or 1931 as being 
active, because it appears in a later list in 1958. Sources used are, MAIC, 1908; Friedmann, cited in Clique, 
1931, pp.243-45; Po, 1931, pp.37-47 and Cosmo, 1958, pp. 95-131. 
69 For these five, although cooperatives existed in the same villages in both 1908 and 1958, the 1958 list fails to 
provide a date for when the cooperative started. 
70 Gide, 1927, pp.92. 
71 The state provided 20 per cent directly and a loan of 60 per cent was available from the Caisse Nationale de 
Credit Agricole, with member required to find the remaining 20 per cent, divided according to individual 
harvest size. Galtier; 1958; 1,'p.346.-
72 For example, Berget, 1925, p.9 and Gide, 1926, pp.94-5. 
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building over a three year period.73 One recent study of the pre Civil War period in Spain 
concludes that, although the financial obstacles to establishing cooperatives were not the only 
ones, they were the decisive. 74 But in both countries the situation by the early 1950s had 
improved significantly. In Italy, the law of 1931 provided three million lire of state money for 
non-repayable grants of up to 20 per cent of long term investment for new cooperatives, and 
15 per cent for improvements of those already in operation, and loans also became easier. The 
1952 law provided conditions not so different from those in France, with state backed loans 
of up to 75 per cent of capital expenditure, at 3 per cent interest. 75 In Spain, by the early 
1950s, the Ministry of Agriculture was also providing loans of up to 80 per cent of the capital 
cost of cooperative installation, over a ten year period and at 2.5 per cent interest.76 
A second factor in explaining the different rates of growth of cooperatives is ideology. 
In France, for example, the early success of many of the small cooperatives in the south, and 
in particular in Var, is attributed to the role played by socialism. The catholic church was very 
active in some areas of France as well, with competition between the different groups 
benefiting farmers. 77 However in Italy, one of the chief weaknesses of the cooperative 
movement as a whole was "the rapid and excessive multiplication of societies having the 
same aims and, inevitably, competing with each other."78 By the early 1920s, there were three 
main groups - the Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative which allied itself to the socialist, the 
Confederazione Cooperativa Italiana, formed by the catholics in 1921, and finally, the 
Sindicato Italiano delle Cooperative, formed by the fascists in the same year.79 A national 
federation of cooperative wineries, the Federazione delle Cantine Sociali was established in 
1922. With the coming to power of the fascists in 1922, there was a reorganization of 
cooperatives, and a single body, L'Ente Nazionale Fascista dell Cooperazione created. The 
closure of many socialist cooperatives explains, at least in part, the stagnation of the 
movement in this period. By contrast in Spain, it was the catholic church which provided the 
ideological stimulus for the cooperative movement, accounting for about 90 per cent of the 
total in 1919.80 Although active membership in agricultural cooperatives reached over half a 
million by the early 1930s, their involvement in production, and in particular wine making, 
73 Piqueras, 1981, p.270. 
74 Pan-Mootojo, 1994, p.361. 
75 B'OIY, 1955,00.290, pA9. 
76 B'OIY, 1952,00.254, p.32. 
n Cleary, 1989, ppA6. 
78 Lloyd, 1925, p.2. 
79 Cotta, 1935, ppA-5. 
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was limited.81 It is of interest to note that socialist interest in farm problems in Spain was 
virtually non-existent until just prior to the Civil War. 
Although access to long term capital and the role of ideologies explain part of the 
relative success of wine cooperatives in each country, there are certainly not the only factors. 
In particular, there were significant variations in the regional concentration of cooperatives 
within each country, as shown in Table 6. In France 71 per cent of all cooperatives were 
found in the south in 1951, with over half of all growers belonging to one. In Italy 
concentration was even greater, with 83 per cent of cooperatives being in the North of the 
country. Finally in Spain, the Mediterranean and Navarra accounted for 79 ofthe total. It is 
perhaps not surprising to find cooperatives in regions were viticulture was of importance. 
However, and what has to be explained, is why they were rarer in some major wine producing 
areas. 
A number of explanation can be put forward. First, there had to be a concentration of 
growers if the cooperatives were to receive sufficient grapes. Cooperatives would be 
unattractive to potential members if it took the grower a couple of hours to transport grapes 
by mules to the cooperative, an hour to unload them, and then two hours to return to the 
vineyard. Motor transport would, of course, eventually reduce the problem of distance but, 
and as one contemporary wrote, an owner with motor transport in the mid 1920s would be in 
no need of a cooperative!82 A successful cooperative was likely to be found in a village with 
both a sufficient volume of grapes, and fragmentation of land ownership. In France in 1951, 
the average cooperative had a capacity of20 thousand hectoliters, and a membership of209, 
producing about 100 hectoliters each.s3 Yet within the country, there were important 
differences. In particular, cooperative members in the Languedoc were quite clearly the 
smaller growers of the region (56 per cent of growers, producing only 26 per cent of the 
wine), whereas in the "rest of France", there were above average size (3 per cent of the total, 
producing 23 per cent ofthe wine). In the "rest of France" cooperatives had fewer members 
(164 members against 212 in the Languedoc), but each produced over twice as much wine 
(119 hectoliters against 53). Information of individual production within a cooperative is 
unfortunately scarce. In Vergeze (Languedoc), where average production was 112 hectoliters, 
over of the half members contributed less than 50 hectoliters, and 12 per cent of members 
80 Garrido, 1996, p.61. 
11 Garrido, 1996, Pan-Montojo, 1994, pp.361-5 and Simpson, 1995, pp.228-31. 
12 Gide, 1926, p.138. ' 
13 Calculated from B'OIV, 1954, no.283, pp,46-7. 
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were responsible for half of all output, at an average of 485 hectoliters per member. What this 
suggests is that, although cooperatives might attract relatively large numbers of part time 
growers, at least half their production would be provided by full time professional grape 
growers. 
This brings us to a second, and related point, and that is the demand by growers for a 
wine cooperative. Their relative absence in regions such as Puglie, Tuscany, or La Mancha 
until after the Civil War, was partly because of the presence oflarge private producers. A 
cooperative of 15,000 hectoliters for example, required a feed area of approximately 1,000 
hectares in the province ofCiudad Real in La Mancha, and 715 in Puglie in the early 1920s.84 
As we have commented, sharecropping was an important feature in the significant growth in 
vines in both these regions during the period. Sharecroppers had little capital, and 
landowners or wine merchants constructed the wine making facilities. At time of conflict, 
such as in La Mancha in the immediate years leading up to the Civil War, it was the low price 
of grapes which wine makers were offering, rather than the price of wine, which was in 
dispute.8s Likewise in a traditional sharecropping region, such as Tuscany, it was the central 
farm - the fattoria - which made the wine of all the sharecroppers. In 1950 there were still no 
wine cooperatives in Tuscany, despite the region producing about a tenth of the nation's wine. 
For sharecroppers, the temporary nature of their contracts was also an obstacle for the 
long term investment in a cooperative. The cantina sociale in Piumazzo (Modena) tried to 
overcome this problem by having two types of members: permanent ones (soci effectivi), 
who could only leave the cooperative if they sold their land or in other, strictly defined 
circumstances, and annual members (soci annuali) -sharecroppers who could use the 
cooperative facilities, but who played a very limited role in the administration.86 In general, 
therefore, cooperatives were late to appear in those regions where sharecropping was found. 
One notable exception to this rule is Catalufia. However in this region, contracts often lasted 
for the life of the vine, giving the sharecropper greater stability to make the long term 
commitment that cooperative membership usually required. 
The major expansion of viticulture in the Languedoc was also accompanied by an 
early and rapid growth in cooperatives. Here in contrast with both Puglie and La Mancha, 
growth was accompanied with the spread of small property ownership which co-existed with 
84 Average yields in 1922/6 were 15 hectoliters in Ciudad Real, and 21 in Puglie. 
8S Ladron 
86 Clique, 1931, pp.246-7. 
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the large vineyards, rather than sharecropping.87 The strength of this small property 
ownership, and the access to long term cheap bank loans made the development of 
cooperatives much easier than in either Puglie or La Mancha. 
A third explanation of the different speed of regional growth was wine quality. In 
much of Europe in this period each grower produced a variety of different grapes. These were 
then often mixed together haphazardly during production, but the final product of each 
grower was very different, depending on the mix of grapes that had been used. Although one 
of the major advantages of cooperatives was their ability to produce a standardized product, 
they in general found it hard to price grapes other than by their sugar content. One possibility, 
common in Italy during the 1920s or with some of the middle quality Bordeaux wines in the 
1930s and 1940s, for example, was for growers to bring only part of their harvest to the 
cooperative, and press themselves those grapes which they felt produced the best wine.88 
However, if this helped overcome the problem of the diversity of grape varieties in a region, 
it had two obvious negative consequences. In the first instance, growers who only used the 
cooperative for perhaps half their production, would have less interest in its long term 
success. Second, it was the poor quality wines made from the least desirable grapes, which 
was considered one of the major weaknesses of the Italian cooperatives in this period.89 Grape 
variety also helps to explain the high density of cooperatives in the Languedoc, where they 
had become more standardized than in most other regions, with the aramon (red wines) and 
clairette ( white) predominating.9o 
Quality wines could, and indeed were, produced in cooperatives. The fact that 
fermenting vats were about 300 hectoliters - the equivalent of perhaps ten hectares 
production, allowed larger growers the possibility of using the superior technologies (and 
scientific knowledge) available in the cooperative, but then keeping their wines separate from 
the rest. After fermentation, the wines were collected from the cooperative, and matured in 
their own private cellars. 
A fourth factor was clustering. Cooperatives, at least prior to the Second World War, 
were in general found around a major center of commercial viticulture in each country, 
namely the Languedoc, Piedmonte and Catalufia. After the first few cooperatives were 
established, each region used its major wine journals, wine research centers, specialist 
87 For the lack of sharecropping in the Languedoc, see Pech, 1975, p.55. 
88 Clique and Roudie, 1994, p.282. 
89 Berget, 1925;Cited in Clique, 1931, p:241. 
90 Gide, 1927, pp.92-3. 
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equipment producers, etc., to help in the diffusion of the cooperative concept.91 To reinforce 
this, regional federations were founded whose aim, amongst others, was quite naturally to 
establish more cooperatives. Even when national associations appeared, meetings and 
conferences tended to be held in those areas where the concentration of cooperatives was 
already high. This did not make it impossible for cooperatives to develop in new areas. 
However, when the Compagnie ferroviaire d'Orleans wanted to encourage producers in the 
southwestern France to build cooperatives, it had to organize visits for prospective members 
to the Burgundy, to see one in operation.92 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown how in the face of adverse wine prices and rising production 
costs, grape and wine producers looked not just to new technologies, but also to formal and 
informal cooperation as a means of remaining competitive. Although it is the large wineries 
which are the most visible source of cooperation amongst growers, this paper has tried to 
place equal emphasis on other informal cooperation. Contracts often proved remarkably adapt 
at changing to different circumstances, and informal and unwritten contracts of a wide nature 
existed, both helping landowners secure adequate skilled labor at cheaper rates, and for 
smaller, sometimes illiterate growers, to capture some of the benefits of the scientific 
revolution through which viticulture was passing. In the Languedoc, a region which has 
featured prominently in this work, it was reported that even at the end of our period, about 
two thirds of all vineyards, and a quarter of the region's vines were found on holdings of less 
than three hectares, where growers lacked all the necessary equipment. The report concludes 
that it was only mutual aid which allowed vineyards of this size to remain viable.93 
Cooperative wineries provided access for small and medium sized producers to the 
rapidly improving scientific knowledge of wine making, together with equipment which was 
far beyond their means to obtain privately. Cooperatives also improved growers' bargaining 
power for selling the wine. However, without access to long term credit, it was difficult for 
cooperatives to be established. By the end of our period the movement was taking on a very 
new phase in France, with wine cooperatives being used by the state to help coordinate 
intervention in the wine market, both by limiting the types of vines used by growers, and by 
91 One major exception to this rule was Navarra, the home to 22 per cent of Spain's wine cooperatives in the 
early 1950s. The explanation here is a different form of clustering, in this case the province had an unusually 
high level of cooperative activity in all areas of agriculture. See, especially, Majuel0 and Pascual, 1991. 
92 Roudie, 1994, p.276. 
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controlling the release of wine onto the national market. The extent by which these forms of 
cooperation amongst producers was efficient is more difficult to measure. Without the formal 
and informal cooperation shown in this paper, there can be little doubt that the speed of the 
rural exodus would have been faster both before, and after, 1950. But wine cooperatives 
appear to have competed amongst themselves, with market regulation being provided by the 
state. Finally, wine prices, and wine quality, both moved in a favorable direction for 
consumers in all three countries. 
93 Etudes et Conjoncture, 1956, 6, p.530. 
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Nominal wine prices have been divided by the cost of living index of each country. 
Sources: 
Italy: ''vino comune", ISTAT, 1958. 
France: Statistique Generale de la France. Annuaire Statistique, 1933, and 
Scholliers and Zamagni, 1995, pp.207-8. 
Spain: Balcells, 1980, pp.377-9, and Maluquer de Motes, 1989, pp.518-9. 
1930 
Table 1. 
Wine production and world trade. 
1880/4 1909113 1925/29 1950/4 
Output Exports Output Exports Output Exports Output Exports 
France 33.6 2.5 58.6 2.0 56.8 1.5 58.4 2.2 
Italy 30.5 2.1 50.5 1.6 45.7 1.1 47.7 1.1 
Spain 21.2 6.9 14.9 3.1 23.6 4.l 17.9 1.0 
Total 85.4 11.5 124.0 6.6 126.0 6.7 124.0 4.3 
Exports 13.4% 5.4% 53% 3.5% 
as%of 
output 
. . FIgures m mIlhons ofhectohters . 
Sources: Mitchell, 1975, pp.278-82 and 345-50. Output figures refer to must, some of 
which was used for making vinegar. Spanish 1880/4 output refers to 1885, AntUnez, 1887, 
p.l6. 
Table 2 
Changes in relative wages and wine prices. 
France Italy Spain 
1870-9 100 100 100 
1880-9 76 82 
1890-9 118 124 
1900-9 184 156 134 
1910-9 96 l39 130 
1920-9 142 180 288 
1930-9 188 344 300 
Nominal wages have been divided by wine prices. 
Sources: 
France: wages - Levy-Leboyer (1971, table 11, p.490), cited in Scholliers and Zamagni, 
1995, pp.207-9; wine prices- Annuaire Statistique, vol. 1933, pp.62-3 and Pech, 1975, 
pp.51 1-3. 
Italy: wages - 1870-9 taken as 1.5 lira; Arcari, 1936, pp.270-1; wine prices - ISTAT, 1958, 
p.178. 
Spain: wages - Gutierrez Bringas, 1998 (limited number of years); wine prices for Sant 
Pere de Ribes (Barcelona), cited in Balcells, 1980, pp.337-9. 
Table 3 
AREA, OUTPUT AND YIELDS IN VITICULTURE. 
France 
1880/4 1909/13 1925/29 1950/54 
Area 2125 1597 1520 1395 
Production 33.34 46.62 56.84 56.18 
Yield per 15.7 29.2 37.4 40.3 
hectarea 
Algeria 
1880/4 1909/13 1925/29 1950/54 
Area 40 137 214 368 
Production 0.62 7.90 11.06 15.58 
Yield per 15.9 57.5 51.7 42.3 
hectare a 
1880/4 1909/13 1925/29 1950/54 
Area 1307 1852 1808 
Production 22.48 46.02 41.19 
Yield per 17.7 25.6 23.5 
hectarea 
1880/4 1909/13 1925/29 1950/54 
Area 1710 1278 1438 1483 
Production 21.64 14.86 23.57 17.88 
Yield per 12.7 11.6 16.4 12.1 
hectarea 
Sources: France and Algeria, Lachiver, 1988. 
Italy. MAIC, 1892; MAIC 1914; ISTAT, 1927. Area of mixed cultivation 
has been divided by 3.6, and yields multiplied by 1.03 to compensate for grapes not pressed 
(i.e. table grapes). 
Spain. Simpson, 1985b and Barciela, 1989. 
Table 4 
French cooperatives and long-term borrowing, c.1910. 
No of cooperatives No with long term loans 
Cheese making, dairies and 2,485 53 
butter 
Wine 39 31 
Starch 34 2 
Collective purchase/ use of 23 15 
agricultural machinery 
Oil mills 20 9 
Distilling 17 13 
Others 42 5 
Sources: I.I.A. 1911, pp.277 and 281. 
Figures for the number of cooperatives and membership are only approximate, as there was 
often a delay between their formation and the start of production, and those cooperatives 
which ceased activity often remained officially active for a number of years in the official 
figures. 
Table 5 
Growth in wine-making cooperatives in Italy, France, and Spain. 
Italy 
Number of Number of 
cooperatives members 
1924 (a) 80 
1928 (b) 84 10,732 
1931 (c) 98* 12,481 
1932 (c) 128 15,909 
1938 (d) 147 18,820 
1951 (e) 161 
* plus 17 more ID construction. 
France 
Number of Number of 
cooperatives members 
1908 (t) 13 
1914 (g) 79 
1920 (t) 92 
1929 (t) 630+ 
1939 (t) 827 
1943 (t) 852 142,000 
1952 (e) 1,023 214,306 
.. 




Early 1920s (g) 50-60 
1951 (e) 215 
1953 (e) 263 
Sources: 
(a) Marchesi, 1925, pp.81-4. 




(c) 1ST A T Annuario statistico italiano. 
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Capacity (OOOs Wine produced 
hI) (OOOs hI) 
1,500 
2,422 
(d) ISTAT Annuario statistico dell'agricoltura Italiana, anno 1939, Roma 1940. 
(e) B'OIV 1955, no.290. 
(t) B'OIV 1952, no.254. 
(g) Lachiver, 1988; p.482: 
(h) Rivas Moreno, n.d., p.280. 
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Regional distribution of wine cooperatives, early 1950s. 
A. FRANCE, 1951. 
No of cooperatives % of growers in 
cooperatives 
Languedoc- 521 56.1 
RoussiIlion 
Lower Rhone 181 53.l 
Gironde 61 14.2 
Rest of France 223 3.0 
TOTAL 986 l3.0 
B. ITALY, 1952-3. 
No of cooperatives % of total 
North 172 82.7 
Center 10 4.8 
South 17 8.2 
Islands 9 4.3 
TOTAL 208 100.0 
C.SPAIN, 1952. 
No of cooperatives % of total 
Anda1ucia 5 2.3 
North 1 0.4 
CastiIla,Le6n & 6 2.8 
Extremadura 
CastiIla-La Mancha 26 12.1 
Upper Ebro 50 23.3 
Arag6n 4 l.9 
Mediterranean 122 56.7 
Canary Islands 1 0.4 
TOTAL 215 99.9 
Sources: 
B'OIV, 1954, no.283, pp.46-7. France -
Italy -
Spain-
B'OIV, 1955, no. 290, p.47 and ISTAT, 1954. 
B'OIV, 1955, no.290. 







% of nation's wine 






% of nation's wine 
produced in region 
12.5 
9.4 
17.1 
21.7 
6.3 
3.2 
29.6 
0.2 
100.0 
